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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE 
PARENTS 
JEFFREY A. PARNESS† 
California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
fatherhood.1 
[A] court may find . . . more than two persons with a claim to
parentage . . . if . . . recognizing only two parents would be
detrimental to the child.2
INTRODUCTION 
In context, the first quote, from a United States Supreme 
Court opinion, concluded there could be no dual paternity in 
California for federal constitutional childcare purposes.  Such 
childcare encompasses the principle that parents, as defined by 
state law, have superior rights, under the United States 
Constitution, to the “care, custody, and control” of their children.3  
† Emeritus Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby 
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. An early draft of this Article was presented 
at the Sixth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium on November 7, 2015 at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law. The Article has benefitted greatly from the 
reviews by Professors Marc D. Falkoff, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Heidi Frostestad 
Kuehl, and Laurel A. Rigertas. Danny Mark, Matt Cole, Randall Roelfsema, David 
A. Saxe, and Alex Yorko provided excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
1 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (plurality opinion). Cf. id. at
162 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is hardly rare in this world of 
divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the ‘father’ to whom her mother is 
married, and still have a relationship with her biological father.”). 
2 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of 
2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, § 1853 (Westlaw 
through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.) (“[A] court may determine that a child 
has more than 2 parents.”). Case law has also permitted three childcare parents in 
the absence of statute. See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Colo. App. 2012) 
(concluding psychological parent shared custody with two biological parents); T.E.B. 
v. C.A.B., 2013 PA Super 211, 74 A.3d 170, 178–79 (finding shared custody between
biological father, presumptive father—the husband—and birth mother); Jacob v.
Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super 118, ¶¶ 21–26, 923 A.2d 473, 481–82 (concluding
custody shared between birth mother, her same-sex partner, and the sperm donor
who served as a parent in an assisted human reproduction birth).
3 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also id. 
at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) (“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in 
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The second quote, from a more recent California statute, 
recognizes there can be dual or triple paternity or maternity, 
though nature alone usually does not allow a second biological 
father or mother.4  Thus, this quote suggests that “nature itself” 
need not always accompany a finding of legal parentage outside 
of formal adoption.  It allows function to supplement or trump 
actual or presumed biological ties—for example, marital 
paternity presumptions—as an avenue to legal parentage, and 
invites legal parentage by agreement. 
Functional and contractual parents are proliferating in the 
United States, both in and outside of “dual parenthood.”5  Today, 
in California and elsewhere, “nature itself” does not foreclose the 
possibility of not only three parents for a child, but also of only 
two female parents or only two male parents, where some or all 
have no biological ties to the child.6 
the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 87 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental 
liberty interest in caring for and guiding their children . . . .”); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]here is a beginning point that commands general, perhaps 
unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions: As our case law has developed, the 
custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference 
by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The parental right 
stems from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
4 With unnatural help, there can be dual paternity or maternity in limited 
settings. See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 
42 (2d ed. 2011) (describing the “blended intrauterine insemination” process with a 
few cases); see also Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced 
Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 107, 131–32 (2014) (describing technologies allowing a child to be born with 
“the genetic material of three men and three women”). As the statute references 
“persons” with parentage claims, it also contemplates the possibility of triple 
maternity, triple paternity, or three parents who each are unaligned with a 
particular gender. Here, too, nature alone does not itself prompt parentage under 
law. Consider, for example, mitochondrial replacement therapy, which involves 
nuclear DNA from an original egg and mitochondrial DNA from a donor egg, to 
prompt a childbirth wherein the intended parents are lesbian couples who are not 
egg donors. See, e.g., Amy B. Leiser, Note, Parentage Disputes in the Age of 
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 104 GEO. L.J. 413, 416–17 (2016). 
5 See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2013 ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2015), http://www.cdc. 
gov/art/pdf/2013-report/art_2013_national_summary_report.pdf. 
6 See Margalit et al., supra note 4, at 110–11. 
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The quotes also suggest that American state lawmakers 
control parenthood issues for purposes of determining federal 
constitutional childcare.  As these federal constitutional parental 
childcare rights are fundamental, they cannot be easily 
overridden by state legislators or judges even if their quite 
reasonable goal is to protect the child by serving the child’s best 
interests.7  Parents defined by state law hold significantly 
protected federal constitutional childcare rights.8  Of course, 
state parental childcare rights can extend, though not limit, 
federal constitutional parental childcare.9 
Left unexplained is how federal constitutional 
rightsholders10 came to be largely defined by state laws.11  
Typically, federal—often Supreme Court—precedents define 
federal constitutional rightsholders,12 as well as the substantive 
7 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73 (plurality opinion) (“As we have explained, 
the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right 
of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 
‘better’ decision could be made.”). 
8 Federal constitutional childcare rights have been read to encompass custodial 
interests, so that once custody of a child has been awarded to one parent, the other 
parent has no federal constitutional childcare rights to visitation. Uwadiegwu v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 91 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding noncustodial 
parent has no federal constitutional right to intimate association with his or her 
child where there was no termination of parental rights, that is, no “wholesale 
relinquishment” of the parent’s rights with respect to his or her child and where 
there was a visitation opportunity that was not “shocking, arbitrary, and egregious,” 
though the noncustodial parent would need to travel from New York to Mississippi 
to visit). 
9 See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (following 
dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and finding putative 
biological father has waivable Iowa constitutional right to challenge paternity 
presumption favoring husband of birth mother where her marriage remains intact); 
In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (holding that the Texas 
Constitution protects against denying all putative fathers standing to sue in 
paternity regarding a child born into a marriage between others). 
10 Herein the term “rightsholders” is employed, though not typically used by 
courts or commentators. While state courts often speak of “standing” to seek court-
ordered childcare, that term is often confusing. See, e.g., Daniel Townsend, Who 
Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 77 
(2015) (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court precedents requiring that a plaintiff suing to 
enjoin unconstitutional governmental action “be injured in order to have standing”). 
11 These laws often chiefly originate in statutes and judicial precedents. Seldom 
do these state parentage laws arise via state constitutional law directives. But see, 
e.g., Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 192.
12 For an excellent review of how the Supreme Court has defined federal
constitutional rightsholders, especially as to corporations, aliens, and felons, see Zoë 
Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 605, 619 (2016) 
(outlining a unified approach for federal constitutional personhood determinations). 
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and enforcement aspects of such constitutional rights.  There is 
general uniformity nationwide, per federal cases, among the 
criminally accused,13 gun toters,14 and abortion seekers15 who 
possess and enforce the same federal constitutional rights.16  
Thus, for example, the definition of which women have a right to 
abort does not vary much from state to state.17 
Why are the requisites for federal constitutional child 
caretakers largely left to state lawmakers?  Both Supreme Court 
and congressional explanations, when offered, fail to justify the 
extreme deference and the resulting significant interstate 
variations as to who is a parent for federal constitutional 
parental childcare purposes.  These very broad variations in who 
possesses fundamental federal constitutional rights are unique to 
the childcare setting, causing many problems for children and 
those who care for them.  These problems would be mitigated if 
child caretakers, like the criminally accused, gun owners, and 
abortion seekers, were more precisely defined by federal 
13 The right of the criminally accused to a Sixth Amendment jury trial applies to 
state criminal cases. Yet, it is inapplicable to “petty crimes,” though there can be 
exceptions under federal constitutional precedents. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N. 
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 n.4 (1989); cf. Bado v. United States, 120 A.3d 50, 63 
(D.C. Cir.), vacated, 125 A.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (mem.). 
14 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is applicable to states); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (finding “people” holding the right to bear arms
“unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified
subset”); Walker v. United States, 800 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding person
possessing right to bear arms can lose it by becoming a felon and not having federal
civil rights restored, per 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)).
15 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(finding states cannot place a “substantial obstacle” in paths of those seeking 
abortions); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 424, 427 (1990) (concluding minors 
have abortion right though exercise of the right can be subject to some state 
regulation, including prior parental notice or, in the alternative, obtaining a judicial 
bypass of this notice requirement). 
16 Certainly, those possessing federal constitutional rights may have those 
rights limited in particular contexts, as with adults who choose to work in settings 
involving drugs, interdiction, or the need to carry a firearm. See Bd. of Educ. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (discussing adults working with public school children 
participating in extracurricular activities); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670–71 (1989). 
17 See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (holding that, while all women have the right 
to an abortion, the state can regulate differently the exercises of that right by 
women under the age of eighteen). There are different state laws regulating access 
to abortion by all rightsholders, which are often criticized. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw 
& Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4–5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679373. 
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lawmakers.  The Supreme Court, not Congress, should provide 
more precise definitions.  New cases should address the open 
questions that forestall complete uniformity as to who constitutes 
a federal constitutional parental child caretaker.18  This Article 
explores the questions that implicate biological, functional, and 
contractual legal parents, and how such a resolution by the 
Supreme Court would benefit child caretakers, their children, 
and the country overall.19 
I. THE FEW FEDERAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE PARENTAL
CHILDCARE LAWS 
Undoubtedly, the United States Supreme Court has set 
limits on state parentage laws akin to federal constitutional 
parental childcare rights.  And there are some congressional 
enactments further unifying parental childcare interests across 
the country.  Still, sharp interstate contrasts are expanding 
quickly without significant intervention by federal lawmakers. 
To date, there has been no perceived “ ‘major damage’ to ‘clear 
and substantial’ ” federal interests in the increasing state 
parental childcare variations.20  Federal lawmakers are 
seemingly content—or at least silent—for now on the differing 
state law definitions of parents who possess federal 
constitutional childcare rights.  The United States Constitution, 
the Supreme Court, or Congress may each constrain state 
parental childcare lawmaking. 
18 Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 
16, 24 (2015) (recognizing “the difficulty of deciding between more gradually building 
a solid foundation for the recognition of new constitutional rights and immediately 
addressing serious indignities and other harms”). This Article posits that current 
variations in American state childcare parent laws are causing “impermissible 
geographic variation[s] in the meaning of federal law.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015). 
19 Concededly, not everyone laments upon the current broad lawmaking 
authority over parental childcare now vested in American state lawmakers. Some 
wish even broader authority. E.g., Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 81 (2015) (“An essential part of long-term reform of 
American family law should include eroding and ultimately overruling existing case 
law holding that parents have a constitutionally protected substantive due process 
right to the custody and control of their children. . . . Ending due process-based 
constitutional rights for parents would free up the states to consider different 
parental rights regimes.”). 
20 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting United States v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). 
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A. The Federal Constitution
Within the United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights, there
is no explicit recognition of parental childcare interests or of 
congressional authority to define such interests.  For enumerated 
rights like speech,21 press,22 and religion,23 the Constitution is 
silent on affirmative congressional authority, though it 
constrains that authority.  For the Civil Rights Amendments on 
involuntary servitude,24 equal protection,25 due process,26 and 
voting,27 the Constitution provides that Congress has the 
affirmative power “to enforce [those rights] . . . by appropriate 
legislation.”28 
So, whether or not Congress has any say on enforcement of 
federal constitutional rights, be they enumerated or 
unenumerated, the Supreme Court largely determines who 
rightsholders are and what rights they hold.29  As for who the 
rightsholders are, the Constitution itself provides some direction 
to the Court, as certain rights are held by “the people,”30 while 
others are held by “citizens”31 or by persons.32  The Constitution 
provides no explicit direction when rights are based in limits on 
governmental authority.33 
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. amend. XIII, § 1. 
25 Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. amend. XV, § 1. 
28 Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2; see also id. amend. XIV, § 5. 
29 Of course, high court precedents on rightsholders are sometimes surprising, 
as when free speech rights were accorded to corporations. See Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (recognizing First Amendment 
speech protections for corporations); Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate 
Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (2015) (reviewing criticisms while urging 
that corporate personhood needs “a more nuanced analysis” and suggesting 
“adjustments in corporate governance rather than constitutional law”). 
30 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable search and seizure). 
31 See, e.g., id. amend. XV, § 1 (voting). 
32 See, e.g., id. amend. V (double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and due process, 
among others). 
33 Id. amend. I. (Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion nor 
abridge the freedom of speech). For another review of the varying explicit federal 
constitutional approaches to federal constitutional rightsholders, see Robinson, 
supra note 12, at 609–10. 
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All federal constitutional rights are “the supreme Law of the 
Land,” binding upon “Judges in every State.”34  For these rights, 
generally the rightsholders, the rights held, and the enforcement 
avenues vary insignificantly interstate.  There are some 
differences between the states on the federal constitutional rights 
of those “accused” criminally,35 those contesting illegal searches,36 
and those with family-related privacy interests in abortion37 and 
marriage.38 
Yet, for one federal constitutional right, the rightsholders—
but neither the protections afforded by the right nor the 
enforcement of the right—significantly differ interstate.  The 
relatively uniform federal constitutional approach to the 
attributes of parental childcare rights39 contrasts sharply with 
the proliferation of interstate variations in defining the parents 
possessing such rights.  The Supreme Court recognizes broad 
discretion in the states to define federal constitutional parental 
34 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
35 Id. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because 
we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental . . . we hold that the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—
were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee.”). 
36 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) 
(holding that passengers in a searched automobile, who had no ownership interest in 
the automobile or in property seized from the automobile, had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy, and noting that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and 
enforceable only by those whose rights were infringed); see also New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 341–43 (1985) (distinguishing prisoners, who “retain no
legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells,” from school children (citing
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669–70 (1977)), and finding school children have
some privacy expectations, to be determined by a court in a given case via a
“reasonableness standard” that applies nationwide).
37 Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/15 (West, Westlaw through Act 
99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing that parents of unemancipated minor to be
notified prior to minor’s abortion), with MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53 (LEXIS through
2016 Reg. Sess., 1st Extra. Sess., and 2d Extra. Sess.) (stating that consent of both
parents are required for abortion performed on an unemancipated minor).
38 Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-102 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra. 
Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.) 
(establishing that male who is seventeen can marry with parental consent), with 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-106 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. 
Assemb.) (establishing that a male who is sixteen or seventeen can marry with 
consent of both parents). 
39 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (addressing parental 
childcare rights when grandparents seek visitation rights). 
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childcare rightsholders, which has resulted in varying state law 
definitions of parentage for federal constitutional childcare 
purposes.40 
B. United States Supreme Court Precedent
While the leeway afforded to state lawmakers is broad, their
given discretion to define federal childcare parents is not 
boundless.  A few Supreme Court precedents do limit state 
definitional authority.41  Thus, to date, all women who bear 
children as a result of sex are parents at birth with federal 
constitutional childcare interests.42  However, all men who, via 
sex, impregnate women who later bear children are not 
necessarily such parents.  Where birth mothers are unmarried, 
biological fathers only have a federally protected opportunity 
interest in establishing parenthood in order to be heard later on 
childcare,43 with the establishment requisites largely left to state 
lawmakers.44  The requisites for exercising childcare parenthood 
opportunities vary significantly interstate.45  Incidentally, legal 
parenthood under state law often varies intrastate, including in 
contexts where the court must determine parents for child 
support and for crimes.46 
The Supreme Court has given states the discretion whether 
to afford any parental childcare opportunities to biological 
fathers of children born of adulterous sex.47  Where states afford 
40 See id. at 73. 
41 See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 
62–64 (2001). 
42 See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (holding no equal protection violation in treating 
biologically tied men and women differently in parentage laws on childcare). 
43 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (finding in most cases state laws 
determine child custody issues). 
44 See, e.g., id. (“Rules governing . . . child custody . . . vary from State to 
State.”). 
45 See, e.g., Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1057–68 (2002) (discussing variations in state uses 
of putative father registries in adoption cases involving required notices to unwed 
biological fathers). 
46 See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding biological 
father, “no matter how removed he may be emotionally from the child,” may still 
have “duties of support under state law” to a child placed for adoption by his 
mother); State v. Paradis, 2010 ME 141, ¶ 6, 10 A.3d 695, 696–97 (holding biological 
father with no childcare opportunity may nevertheless be prosecuted for sexual acts 
as a parent to his child/victim). 
47 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(recognizing such discretion, as long as a state law serves “a legitimate end by 
2016] FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE PARENTS 973 
such opportunities notwithstanding marital paternity 
presumptions, the associated requirements differ.48  For example, 
Pennsylvania is at least one state that generally denies any 
parental childcare rights to such biological fathers, so that a 
biological father has no standing to rebut a marital paternity 
presumption.49  Iowa, however, recognizes state constitutional 
parental childcare rights in such a biological father.50 
Broad state lawmaking discretion in defining those with 
federal parental childcare rights emanates, in particular, from 
three major Supreme Court cases.  One is Lehr v. Robertson, 
where an unwed biological father of a child born of sex to an 
unwed mother sought to participate in an adoption proceeding 
involving the mother’s new husband.51  There, the Court 
recognized that state lawmakers could vary in their norms on 
denying such a father any participation right and veto power.52  
While the Court recognized that the “intangible fibers that 
connect parent and child” via biology “are sufficiently vital to 
merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases,” it concluded 
that in “the vast majority of cases, state law determines the final 
outcome” when resolving “the legal problems arising from the 
rational means”). Since Michael H., where the unwed biological father was generally 
then not permitted under California law to seek to rebut a marital paternity 
presumption favored by the married couple, id. at 124, even where the biological 
father had “an established parental relationship,” id. at 123, California law has 
changed so as to allow some rebuttals by unwed biological fathers. CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 7541(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of 
the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.). 
48 See, e.g., Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the 
Paternity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55 app. F at 94–95 (2003) (Recent State 
Statutes Allowing Paternity Disestablishment of Marital Children). 
49 See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055–56 (Pa. 1999) (holding no 
rebuttal by unwed biological father where marriage continues). 
50 See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (holding 
unwed biological father has “a liberty interest in challenging paternity” under Iowa 
Constitution). Marital presumption statutes are reviewed in June Carbone & Naomi 
Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 222–28 (2011). 
51 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983). 
52 See id. at 267. 
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parent-child relationship.”53  Before and since Lehr, American 
states have varied regarding the participation rights of unwed 
biological fathers in formal adoption proceedings.54 
Another precedent is Michael H. v. Gerald D., where an 
unwed biological father of a child born of sex to a married woman 
sought to undo the state marital paternity presumption favoring 
the husband.55  The Court ruled that California could deny, as it 
then did, the biological father any opportunity interest in 
establishing childcare parentage, at least where the state desired 
to promote the married couple’s wish to remain an intact nuclear 
family.56  While California public policy has since changed,57 in 
Pennsylvania a legal parentage pursuit of a comparable 
biological father can be thwarted by an intact nuclear family.58  
Both before and since Michael H., American states have varied in 
their approaches to establishing as well as disestablishing 
marital parentage presumptions.59 
53 Id. at 256. The Court also noted that “[r]ules governing . . . child custody are 
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.” Id. In 
United States v. Yazell, where no federal constitutional protections were asserted, 
the Court found “no need for uniformity,” and “solicitude for state interests, 
particularly in the field of family” “should be overridden by the federal courts only 
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government . . . will suffer 
major damage if the state law is applied.” 382 U.S. 341, 352, 357 (1966). 
54 See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in 
Newborn Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 223 (2003) (critically reviewing state laws). 
55 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
56 Id. at 124. 
57 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. 
Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (providing that paternity of husband 
may be rebutted with “evidence based on blood tests”). 
58 Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. 1999) (holding biological fathers 
cannot seek to rebut marital presumption favoring paternity of husband as long as 
marriage is intact and spouses want to maintain presumption). 
59 As to establishment, marital parentage presumptions can be based on birth or 
conception during marriage. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of the 98th Leg.). As to disestablishment, marital 
parentage presumptions may only be rebuttable by the wife or husband. See, e.g., 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(b), (2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) 
(assuming a commitment to stay married and to raise the child as an issue of the 
marriage). In some states, however, in the context of disestablishment, marital 
parentage presumptions may be subject to rebuttal by the biological father, though 
standards can be unclear. See, e.g., In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506 
(Ill. 2004); Waites v. Ritchie (In re Waites), 2012-CT-00884-SCT (¶ 14) (Miss. 2014), 
152 So. 3d 306, 311 (holding biological father can seek custody as long as no 
abandonment, unfitness, or the like). Recently, some lower courts have applied 
2016] FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE PARENTS 975 
The third Supreme Court precedent is Troxel v. Granville, 
where the attributes of superior parental rights were at issue, 
rather than the norms for establishing such rights.60  The case 
involved grandparents who sought a court order on grandparent-
grandchild visits over parental objections.61  In limiting judicial 
opportunity to override parental desires, a few opinions of a 
splintered Court recognized broad state lawmaking discretion on 
parentage and parent-like classes.62  There was mention of child 
visitation laws benefitting third parties, that is, nonparents, via 
“gradations,”63 as well as of possible “de facto” parenthood,64 a 
parentage establishment norm involving neither biological ties 
nor formal adoption.65  Before and since Troxel, American state 
de facto and comparable parentage laws vary in defining who 
becomes federal constitutional childcare parents.66 
There are significant interstate variations today in both 
parentage establishment and disestablishment norms relevant to 
federal constitutional parental childcare rights.  Parentage 
establishment norms go by varying terms, including not only de 
facto parent, but also equitable adoption, presumed parent, and 
marital parentage presumptions in childcare settings to lesbian spouses of birth 
mothers, even when the relevant statutes speak of husbands and presumed 
biological ties. See, e.g., Elizabeth D. v. San Diego Cty. Health & Human Servs. 
Agency (In re D.S.), 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 924 (Ct. App. 2012). 
60 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (plurality opinion). An early Supreme Court precedent 
in a case involving a childcare dispute between a parent and a grandparent had 
suggested there could be no federal law on establishing parental rights. Ex parte 
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890) (“As to the right to the control and possession of 
this child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to 
which neither the congress of the United States, nor any authority of the United 
States, has any special jurisdiction.”). 
61 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
62 Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in dissent, recognized 
Justice Kennedy’s solution as a possible, but ill-advised, “judicially crafted 
definition” of a federal constitutional childcare parent. Id. at 92. 
65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws 
2016, ch. 430) (exercise of “parental responsibility” with “support and consent of the 
child’s parent”); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (LEXIS through Dec. 7, 2016) (single 
parent’s “agreement” and residency in same household). 
66 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 
59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013) [hereinafter Parness, Parentage Law 
(R)Evolution]. Of course, beyond Troxel there can be additional state constitutional
law protections of parental childcare interests. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
573, 579 (Tenn. 1993) (holding state constitutional right to privacy in parenting
decisions).
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parent by estoppel.67  Similarly, for parentage disestablishment 
there are differing terms, including rebuttal and rescission, 
usually depending on how parentage was initially established.68 
While there are distinct state law norms on establishing and 
disestablishing legal parentage relevant to federal constitutional 
parental childcare, generally the holders of other federal 
constitutional rights are uniform across state borders.  The 
criminally accused, whose rights include effective assistance of 
counsel, trial by jury, and speedy trial,69 do not vary widely 
interstate.70  Nor are there generally major interstate differences 
in religious practitioners,71 those subject only to reasonable 
searches,72 and gun toters.73 
The Supreme Court is capable of crafting norms on federal 
constitutional parental childcare rightsholders.  With state 
terminations of existing parental childcare interests, the Court 
has actively set uniform federal constitutional norms.74  It cannot 
be that federal constitutional childcare rightsholders necessarily 
must be left to state law definitions per the Tenth Amendment’s 
reservation of powers, since the Supreme Court has substantially 
federalized other personal privacy rights, including abortion,75 
contraception,76 sexual conduct,77 and marriage.78 
67 See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66. 
68 Marital paternity presumptions are often subject to rebuttal. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(C) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.). 
Voluntary paternity acknowledgments, by contrast, are subject to rescission, as 
driven by federal welfare subsidy policies found in 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D) (2012). 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (like Congress, states may not enact laws abrogating 
a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights). 
70 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (holding speedy 
trial right applies in state criminal cases). 
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) 
(holding like Congress, states may not enact laws prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion). 
72 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding 
exclusionary rule applicable in state criminal cases). 
73 U.S. CONST. amend. II; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 
(2010). 
74 See, e.g., Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (holding clear and 
convincing evidence needed to prove child “permanently neglected”); Lassiter v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30–31 (1981) (holding guidelines on when counsel 
must be made available for parents facing state initiatives to terminate parental 
rights). 
75 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
76 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J., 
concurring). 
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C. Congressional Enactments
The broad discretion held by American state lawmakers
regarding parentage prompting federal constitutional parental 
childcare rights79 generally has not been limited much by 
Congress.80  Congressional enforcement authority might be 
employed, however.81  Yet, its reach is narrow.  Enforcement 
authority is only legitimate when employed to remedy and deter 
Fourteenth Amendment violations, even if prophylactic in that 
the legislation prohibits “a somewhat broader swath of conduct, 
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s 
text.”82  But such authority cannot work “a substantive change in 
the governing law,”83 meaning there can be no “substantive 
redefinition” of Supreme Court precedents on Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.84  Further, congressional exercise of this 
enforcement authority requires “a relevant history and pattern of 
constitutional violations.”85 
Congressional authority regarding federal expenditures 
could also be used to help unify federal constitutional parent 
childcare norms.86  Congressional concerns regarding federally 
subsidized state welfare assistance has already led to uniform 
77 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
78 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). Granted, not 
all federal constitutional childcare rightsholders have been explicitly deemed subject 
to state law definitions. To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
childcare rights when children are born of assisted reproduction. See, e.g., Kimberly 
M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22, 25
(2015) (arguing for federal constitutional protections of assisted reproduction,
though distinguishing noncoital procreation between those wishing to procreate and
parent, and those wishing to procreate for profit).
79 David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of 
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 55 (Robin Fretwell 
Wilson ed., 2006) (recognizing “the [Federal] Constitution’s substantial indifference 
to how states assign parent status”). 
80 On what Congress has done—and should do—regarding family status 
determinations, see, for example, Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 
90 IND. L.J. 787, 790–91 (2015). 
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
82 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). 
83 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
84 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004). 
85 Id. at 521 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 
(2001)); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999). 
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (congressional taxing and spending authority). 
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voluntary paternity-acknowledgment standards across the 
country.87  But here, reimbursements of expended federal welfare 
dollars were the targets, rather than the establishment of more 
uniform parentage norms.88 
Congressional authority regarding interstate commerce,89 
and perhaps other acts with significant national implications,90 
might also be employed, as with establishing guidelines for 
sperm banks and assisted reproduction clinics providing services 
for people from throughout the country.91  Yet, such guidance 
may not—and likely could not, per the aforementioned limited 
enforcement authority of Congress—address uniform parental 
childcare norms that include children born of sex.92 
II. THE FAILURE TO JUSTIFY DEFERRAL TO STATE LAWMAKING
ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE PARENTS
The United States Supreme Court has often recognized the 
right of federal constitutional parental childcare as 
“fundamental.”93  Yet, the Court has not clearly explained why 
87 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John 
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 
53, 56 (2010) (explaining that states have applied the congressional guidelines on 
voluntary parentage acknowledgments both in and outside of welfare settings). 
88 Id. at 56–59. 
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
90 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress shall] make all Laws . . . necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution [the specifically enumerated legislative 
powers]”). 
91 See, e.g., Andrea Preisler, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technology: The 
Dangers of an Unregulated Market and the Need for Reform, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 213, 214 (2013) (explaining how such guidelines might operate); Benjamin 
B. Williams, Note, Screening for Children: Choice and Chance in the “Wild West” of
Reproductive Medicine, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2011).
92 Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the 
States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 333–34 (2009) (reviewing how Congress 
has already utilized its legislative authority in enforcement, spending, and 
interstate commerce matters to unify family laws in the United States, and 
concluding that while Congress has substantial authority over family law matters, it 
should limit its national family legislation to subjects for which there is broad 
political consensus and strong state support); see also Elizabeth G. Patterson, 
Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When Entering the 
Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2008) (reviewing 
congressional initiatives conditioning the receipt of federal funds on family law 
mandates). 
93 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) 
(“[F]undamental rights and liberty interests [include the right] “to direct the 
education and upbringing of one’s children.”); Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
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the rightsholders for this right are substantially defined by state 
lawmakers.  The state laws on rightsholders—typically male for 
now, though this is changing given rapidly expanding uses of 
assisted reproduction, including surrogacy—frequently differ. 
Husbands of birth mothers vary in their federally protected 
childcare interests per state presumed parent laws,94 as do 
unwed biological fathers who conceive children by consensual sex 
with married women.95  State laws on childcare rightsholders 
vary widely today for both parentage establishment and 
disestablishment.96 
Explanatory failures by the Supreme Court abound in the 
2000 Troxel case on parental childcare where grandparents 
sought court-ordered child visitation over parental objections. 
Court statements recognizing broad state lawmaking authority 
on parentage prompting federal constitutional childcare are 
753 (1982) (finding “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their child” is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[F]undamental rights 
and interests [include] the traditional interest of parents with respect to the 
religious upbringing of their children . . . .”); see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 
578–79 (Tenn. 1993) (reviewing additional Supreme Court precedents, though 
employing a state constitutional privacy analysis to find application of the 
Grandparents’ Visitation Act in the case was unconstitutional). 
94 For example, the state laws on the marital presumptions recognizing 
husbands as legal fathers vary in their establishment standards. Compare, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 295 of the 
2016 2d Ann. Sess.) (establishing that husband is presumed father of child “born 
during the marriage”), and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 78th Reg. Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)) (similar), with ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.) 
(establishing that the presumed father is the man to whom the birth mother was 
married at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth of the child), 
and MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 
legislation) (establishing that presumed father is “man to whom” child’s “mother was 
married at the time of conception”). 
95 For example, where their mates are married to other men, state laws on the 
rebutting by biological fathers of the marital paternity presumptions favoring 
husbands vary. Compare, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204(1)(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) (presuming that a husband is the father of a child if the 
child is born during his marriage to the child’s mother), with L.A. Cty. Dep’t of 
Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) 
(holding biological father and husband can each raise a presumption of paternity, 
often prompting a judicial decision on which presumption should be maintained). 
96 See Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 63–87 (demonstrating differences 
in American state laws on establishing and recognizing voluntary paternity 
acknowledgments); see also supra notes 48 (marital parentage presumptions), 57–59 
(marital parentage presumptions), 66–67 (de facto, presumed, and equitable 
parentage) and accompanying text. 
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made without significant judicial elaboration on policy and 
without judicial references to relevant precedents.  In dissent, 
Justice Stevens said:  “It is indisputably the business of the 
States, rather than a federal court employing a national 
standard, to assess in the first instance the relative importance 
of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as 
this.”97  He noted a few Supreme Court precedents, including one 
indicating it is best to leave “matters involving competing and 
multifaceted social and policy decisions” to “local 
decisionmaking,” which he deemed to mean that “caution” for the 
Court was “never more essential than in the realm of family and 
intimate relations.”98  He did not explain why the Court was not 
as cautious regarding the family relations areas of abortion and 
contraception. 
Justice Scalia, also in dissent, deemed “state legislatures” far 
better suited than the Court to craft “definition[s] of parents” 
possessing the “unenumerated parental rights” recognized in 
federal constitutional precedents, which he “would not now 
overrule.”99 
And Justice Kennedy, in dissent, recognized that one fit 
parent’s federal constitutional childcare rights might be limited 
by “a de facto parent” doctrine, where the “family courts in the 50 
States . . . are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet 
inevitable, issues that arise.”100  This observation was founded on 
the preexisting diversity subject matter jurisdiction limit on 
federal district courts issuing divorce, alimony, or child custody 
decrees.101 
Similar statements appear beyond dissents and outside of 
grandparent visitation settings.  In an adoption case, a majority 
of the Supreme Court simply observed that in “the vast majority 
of cases,” state laws govern “the legal problems arising from the 
97 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
98 Id. at 90 n.10 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 
(1992)). 
99 Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 
U.S. 689, 703–04 (1992)). 
101 More particularly, Justice Kennedy relied upon Ankenbrandt, where the 
Court was only concerned with the long history of absence of federal court subject 
matter jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, and the special 
state court proficiencies to monitor compliance with such decrees, and not with the 
absence of federal court authority to define federal constitutional rightsholders. 
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703–04. 
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parent-child relationship.”102  In a property setting involving “a 
conflict between federal and state rules for the allocation of a 
federal entitlement,” a Supreme Court majority observed state 
“family and family-property law” must do “ ‘major damage’ to 
‘clear and substantial’ federal interests” before such a law will be 
overridden.103  While perhaps in the past the harms caused by 
interstate parentage law variations were not “major,” today there 
is “major damage,” as new forms of biological and nonbiological 
parentage have risen sharply, particularly with the increases in 
the numbers of nonmarital children,104 children born of assisted 
reproduction technologies,105 and children “informally” adopted.106 
Commentaries on these Supreme Court pronouncements on 
deference to states generally are unsatisfactory and often 
conclusory.107  One author wrote: 
102 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983). 
103 Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581–82 (1979) (quoting United 
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 
1943, 1950 (2013) (employing Hisquierdo in a different property setting); Rose v. 
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (employing the same language used in Hisquierdo 
and Yazell in a different property setting). 
104 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of 
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 652 n.9 (2008); Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final 
Data for 2013, in 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. NO. 1, 38–40 (2015), https://www.cdc. 
gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01.pdf; ELIZABETH WILDSMITH ET AL., CHILD 
TRENDS, PUB. NO. 2011-29, CHILDBEARING OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE: ESTIMATES AND 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011), http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2013/02/Child_Trends-2011_11_01_RB_NonmaritalCB.pdf (“In 2009, 41 
percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside of marriage, compared with 
28 percent of all births in 1990 and just 11 percent of all births in 1970.”). 
105 On the history of assisted human reproduction, and the recent growth in free 
private sperm donation, see Lauren Gill, Note, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining 
Paternity Rights in the Context of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1715, 1719–25 (2013). On the increases in assisted human reproduction on a 
“do-it-yourself” basis, making governmental regulation more difficult, see, for 
example, A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
106 Herein, “informal adoptions” most significantly include recognitions of a 
second parent for a child with a single parent where the second parent is on equal 
footing with the established parent and achieves parental status, without formal 
adoption, through parental-like acts, utilizing such doctrines as presumed or de facto 
parenthood. On the rise of such doctrines, see, for example, Parness, Parentage Law 
(R)Evolution, supra note 66, at 764–65.
107 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and
Rights: The Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend To 
Disaggregate Family Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 151 (2010) 
[hereinafter Baker, Marriage and Parenthood] (footnote omitted) (“[F]ew people 
question the state’s ability to honor, or not, surrogacy contracts; to recognize, or not, 
second-parent adoption; and to determine, for the most part, who is entitled to 
parental status.”). 
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Some federal activity in the family law realm is unavoidable 
and even desirable. . . . The federal attention can become 
pernicious, however, if federal program requirements demand 
changes in state law that could disrupt the fabric of family law 
and policy in a state.  Because family policy is closely connected 
to community norms and local social cohesion, such disruptions 
can have deleterious social effects that were neither anticipated 
nor desired by Congress.  These disruptions can be, and 
sometimes are, avoided by a less prescriptive federal 
approach . . . .108 
Yet, the avoidance of “deleterious social effects” that upset 
“community norms and local social cohesion” is not so important 
as to preclude federal constitutional norms on rightsholders 
implicating “family law and policy” in such realms as abortion, 
sexual conduct, and same-sex marriage.109 
In a 1992 ruling, often relied upon in judicial opinions where 
public policy explanations are otherwise wanting, the Supreme 
Court did articulate a cogent rationale for limiting federal 
district court subject matter jurisdiction in certain “family policy” 
cases.110  It deemed such jurisdiction could not be exercised when 
“divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders” are 
sought.111  It explained: 
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves 
retention of jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social 
workers to monitor compliance.  As a matter of judicial 
economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work of this 
type than are federal courts, which lack the close association 
with state and local government organizations dedicated to 
handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony, 
and child custody decrees.  Moreover, as a matter of judicial 
expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that federal 
courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the 
special proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . .112 
108 Patterson, supra note 92, at 399; see also id. at 433 (noting that the Supreme 
Court recognizes “community morality, order, and cohesion” in limiting federal 
lawmaking on family matters). 
109 Other critics of the “less prescriptive federal approach” to family law issues 
focus on matters outside of federal constitutional childcare parents. See, e.g., 
Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 
626 (2014) (reviewing the critics). 
110 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 
111 Id. at 703. 
112 Id. at 703–04. 
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Yet, the more particular articulation of who are federal 
constitutional childcare rightholders, without determining which 
parent has custody, visitation, parenting time, or the like, should 
prompt no concerns over later monitoring, implicate no ties to 
local government organizations, nor require judicial expertise 
developed only in state courts. 
This rationale from 1992 sometimes is read too generally and 
taken out of context.  Thus, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in 2015 declared:  “And if the plaintiff 
requests that a federal court determine who should have care for 
and control a child, then that request is outside the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.”113  Yet, the court also recognized that the 
1992 precedent was limited to barriers to federal court 
resolutions of who should have custody, as only then would there 
often be “continuing judicial supervision of a volatile family 
situation” and the “deployment of social workers to monitor 
compliance.”114  Fact-dependent issues of who should be awarded 
childcare differ from general norms on who can seek childcare. 
With the latter, there is no need for continuing jurisdiction or 
deployment of social workers.115 
III. THE RESULTS OF AND THE PROBLEMS WITH DEFERRING
LAWMAKING TO STATES 
The absence of federal laws significantly limiting state 
lawmaking on who may be federal constitutional parental child 
caretakers has resulted in a proliferation of widely varying state 
parentage laws relevant to federal constitutional childcare. 
Divergence arises, in part, due to the variation among separation 
of powers approaches to state judicial common lawmaking when 
statutes are wholly silent or incomplete,116 as they often are, as 
113 Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015). 
114 Id. at 794, 797 (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704; Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 
F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1205 (6th
Cir. 2015) (deeming Chevalier applicable to a narrow range of cases, including those
involving who gets child custody and the calculation of child support payments).
115 Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797. 
116 Compare, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 18–19, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176–77 
(plurality opinion) (noting that while “[p]arenthood is meant to be defined by the 
Legislature,” after thirteen years of noting a statutory need for a de facto parent 
doctrine, three justices concluded “we must provide some guidance”), with Moreau v. 
Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ¶ 26, 196 Vt. 183, 196, 95 A.3d 416, 425 (declining to 
formulate a non-statutory de facto parent doctrine and noting that other courts have 
similarly declined to fill the “perceived vacuum”). A new Parentage Act took effect in 
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well as to varied approaches to recognizing state constitutional 
parental childcare rights.117  Beyond these variations there are 
significant interstate differences in the substantive parentage 
childcare laws grounded on biological ties to children, functional 
parenthood, and contractual parentage.118 
A. Biological Ties
On the import of biological ties for childcare purposes, state
law variations appear both in and outside of assisted human 
reproduction (“AHR”) settings.  For AHR involving surrogates, 
that is, women giving birth who do not intend to parent, 
including women who utilize the eggs of other women who do 
intend to parent, the surrogates may or may not be the legal 
parents at birth.  Some states effectively allow preconception 
waivers of any parental rights by surrogates,119 as well as 
Maine on July 1, 2016. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, §§ 1831–1939 (Westlaw 
through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.). 
117 See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (concluding 
that an unwed biological father of a child born to a woman married to another man 
had a constitutional due process “liberty interest” in Iowa when he challenged the 
husband’s paternity); Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 73, 250 P.3d 465, 484 
(stating that a state constitutional due process liberty interest of parents “to 
maintain ties to” their children includes “a fundamental right to make decisions 
concerning the care and control of their children”); LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, ¶ 57, 338 
P.3d 908, 921 (Wyo. 2014) (declining to adopt de facto parentage or the parentage by
estoppel doctrine, “instead leaving that important policy decision to the Wyoming
Legislature”). For a discussion of when state constitutions will more likely be read to
provide broader protections of individual rights, see, for example, Hodes & Nauser,
MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 368 P.3d 667, 702 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (en banc) (Malone,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that coextensive interpretations of federal and state
constitutions generally occur “only when the provisions themselves are similar”),
review granted (Apr. 11, 2016).
118 See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between 
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622–26 (2009). 
119 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1), (3)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d 
Reg. Sess. of the 24th Leg.) (providing that “[p]rior to engaging in gestational 
surrogacy, a binding and enforceable gestational surrogacy contract shall be made” 
wherein typically a “gestational surrogate agrees to relinquish any parental rights 
upon the child’s birth”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2), (c)(1)(ii) (West, 
Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (similar); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 168-B:11(A)(II) (Westlaw through ch. 330 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“[The gestational
carrier agreement] shall be executed prior to the commencement of any medical
procedures to impregnate the gestational carrier.”). Where gestational surrogates
are married, their spouses may also contractually waive any parental rights prior to
conception. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw
through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing that “gestational surrogacy
contract” shall be executed by the “gestational surrogate’s husband”).
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adoptions of any future children by intended parents, who may 
not need to have been married120 but may need to have 
contributed genetic material prompting birth.121  Other states 
decline to enforce surrogacy pacts.122 
For AHR where a birth mother intends to parent, her 
husband may or may not be a legal parent, depending on 
whether his sperm was employed.123  For AHR births to unwed 
mothers, sperm donors may be statutorily barred from paternity 
of any later-born child.124 
Biological ties also prompt variations in state parentage laws 
when children are born of sex.  While presumed biological ties in 
husbands whose wives give birth generally result in legal 
paternity,125 the timing of the necessary marriage differs 
interstate.  State legislators have alternatively used the timing of 
120 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.590 (West, Westlaw through 78th Reg. 
Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)). 
121 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d 
Reg. Sess. of the 24th Leg.) (stating that the gestational surrogate must agree to 
“assume parental rights and responsibilities . . . if it is determined that neither 
member of the commissioning couple is the genetic parent”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 47/20(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (stating 
that where there are two intended parents, at least one must contribute gametes). 
122 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess. of the 52d Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
legislation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess. of the 98th Leg.). For a review of the “wide spectrum of legal regimes” on 
surrogacy in the United States, see Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A 
Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s 
Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1239–45 
(2014). 
123 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930 
of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (repealed 2017) (differing consent requirements for husbands 
who are and are not the sperm donors). Thus, husbands in nonsurrogacy AHR 
settings may not always be presumed biological fathers of children born to their 
wives. Elsewhere, husbands are presumed fathers if they consent in the same way, 
regardless of whether or not their sperm was used. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation) (employed in a divorce 
and child support setting in Sieglein v. Schmidt, 120 A.3d 790, 793–94 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2015)). 
124 Compare, e.g., Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Ct. App. 
2005) (holding no paternity for sperm donor regardless of intent), with In Interest of 
R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc), and C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
125 On marital paternity presumptions, see Carbone & Cahn, supra note 50, at 
219, 221–28; see also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345 n.1 
(Iowa 2013) (describing varying state laws). 
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marriage relative to conception, pregnancy, and/or birth.126  
Further, there are variations in the standing of those who can 
disestablish parentage by challenging marital parentage 
presumptions.127 
B. Functional Parenthood
As to functional parenthood for federal childcare purposes,
where there are parental-like acts and where there need not be 
either biological ties or any parentage contract, state laws vary in 
naming the doctrines.  There are statutes and judicial precedents 
on, for example, de facto parents and presumed parents.128 
More importantly, there are widely varying standards on 
functional parenthood.  For example, some state laws on 
“presumed” parentage outside of marriage require residency with 
the child since birth,129 while others require no minimum period 
of household residency130 or no household residency at all.131  
126 Compare, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051 (1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 
78th Reg. Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)) (establishing presumption of 
husband’s paternity if child is “born during the marriage”), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.) (“married 
at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth”), and MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation) 
(establishing presumption of husband’s paternity if he and the child’s mother are 
“married at the time of conception”). 
127 Compare, e.g., B.C. v. J.S.U., 158 So. 3d 464, 467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) 
(holding biological father of child born to woman married to another man cannot 
assert parentage when husband persists in his presumption of paternity), and 
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055–56 (Pa. 1999) (similar), with L.A. Cty. Dep’t 
of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 
2004) (holding both husband and biological father of child born to wife can meet 
criteria for “presumed” paternity, and a court often must decide which one of the two 
presumptions to sustain), and Waites v. Ritchie (In re Waites), 2012-CT-00884-SCT 
(¶ 19) (Miss. 2014), 152 So. 3d 306, 314 (holding that for child born into marriage, 
unwed biological father nevertheless entitled to “natural-parent presumption”). 
128 See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66, 752–63 
(providing an overview of evolving state parentage laws). In Delaware, there are 
statutory parents both via de facto status and presumptions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws 2016, ch. 430); id. § 8-204(a).
129 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. of the 84th Leg.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.). 
130 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.) (receipt of child into home); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
6-105(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) (similar); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-43(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation) (similar).
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Some state laws recognize a functional parent where there 
already exist, and will remain, two other parents under law.132  
Incidentally, in settings where there are biological ties but no 
earlier functioning as a parent so that there are no childcare 
opportunities, child support obligations can still be imposed.133 
C. Contractual Parentage
There are also variations in state laws regarding contractual
parentage for childcare purposes.  With AHR nonsurrogacy 
births, some state statutes speak to both marital and nonmarital 
settings,134 while others expressly address only the written 
consent of a husband to parenthood when his wife seeks to 
deliver a child born with anonymously donated sperm.135  When 
statutes do not cover all AHR nonsurrogacy births, courts can 
extend contractual parentage opportunities, as with unwed 
sperm donors who are recognized as childcare parents,136 as well 
131 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 
Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.) (stating that a presumed parent 
establishes “a significant parental relationship”). 
132 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 
2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (failing to recognize three 
parents would be “detrimental to the child”). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, 
§§ 1851(1), 1881(1)(A), 1891(3)(A)–(C) (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the
127th Leg.) (establishing that parents include birth mother, husband as presumed
parent, and de facto parent via, for example, residence, consistent “caretaking,” and
a “bonded and dependent relationship”); id. § 1891(5) (adjudication of de facto
parentage “does not disestablish the parentage” of others).
133 See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); A.S. v. Gift of Life 
Adoptions, Inc. (In re Adoption of Baby A.), 944 So. 2d 380, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006). 
134 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.89, 3111.88(C) (West, Westlaw 
through File 123 of the 131st Gen. Assemb. (2015–2016)) (addressing “non-spousal 
artificial insemination for the purpose of impregnating a woman so that she can bear 
a child that she intends to raise as her child” through using “the semen of a man 
who is not her husband”). “[D]ue process safeguards,” however, may prompt some 
sperm donors to be fathers under Ohio’s statute. C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7613, 7962 (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) 
(addressing AHR outside surrogacy and AHR with gestational carriers); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, §§ 1921–1929, 1931–1939 (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. 
of the 127th Leg.) (AHR outside marital setting and gestational carrier agreements).  
135 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra. Sess., 
2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.); 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. 
Sess.) (repealed 2017) (stating that a sperm donor is not treated as the “natural 
father” unless his wife is inseminated). 
136 See, e.g., Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011). 
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as with husbands recognized as childcare parents when their 
wives conceive without medical assistance via sperm donated by 
one known to the married couple.137  Other states have statutes 
outside marital settings, as when unwed women can secure legal 
parentage via an AHR birth where sperm donors generally are 
not parents under law.138 
In AHR surrogacy settings, some state laws explicitly 
require husbands of projected surrogates to consent in writing to 
an absence of future legal paternity.139  Some state laws allow 
nonegg or nonsemen donors to become legal parents via 
surrogacy pacts,140 while others do not.141  Some state laws 
prohibit surrogacy contracts altogether.142  Some states, under 
certain circumstances, allow men alone to become legal parents 
via AHR surrogacy.143  On the range of state laws, one judge of a 
state high court, upon reviewing existing laws and 
137 See, e.g., Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 327–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013) (relying on a husband’s voluntary consent to artificial insemination as well as 
the statute on a “child of the marriage”). 
138 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Feb. 
Reg. Sess., 2016 May Spec. Sess., and 2016 Sept. Spec. Sess.). 
139 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 
Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring execution of gestational surrogacy 
contract by gestational surrogate’s husband “prior to the commencement of any 
medical procedures”). 
140 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. 
Sess. of the 24th Leg.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(b) (West, Westlaw through 
Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (establishing that where there are two intended 
parents, at least one must contribute gametes and there must be “a medical need” 
for gestational surrogacy); see also In re Baby S., 2015 PA Super 244, 128 A.3d 296, 
306–07 (holding that the nonegg donor was the legal mother of child born to 
surrogate even though there was no statute on point). 
141 See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) 
(finding that the wife of a sperm donor who employed a surrogate needed to adopt to 
become a parent under law as she was not an ovum donor), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 54 A.3d 263 (per curiam) (N.J. 2012). 
142 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 
legislation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. 
Sess. of the 98th Leg.). 
143 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1)(B) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra. 
Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.) (stating 
that unwed sperm donors can utilize surrogates in which case the child is the legal 
child of only the unwed sperm donor, that is, the biological father); In re Roberto 
d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 131–32 (Md. 2007) (similar). Cf. In re Paternity of Infant T., 991
N.E.2d 596, 597–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding unwed sperm donor could
disestablish paternity of surrogate’s husband who consented to disestablishment,
but could not disestablish maternity of surrogate who gave birth even though she too
had agreed to disestablishment, because there would otherwise be no legal second
parent).
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commentaries, concluded:  “Beyond the fact that there is no clear 
majority approach to surrogacy among the states that have acted, 
many states still have said virtually nothing on the topic.  Among 
those that have acted, the legislative approach varies 
significantly from state to state.”144 
Outside of AHR, there are significant variations in state 
laws on contracts involving legal parenthood.  Thus, only some 
state laws afford legal parenthood to a second parent where an 
existing single parent expressly supports and consents to the 
second parent’s earlier child caretaking.145  Only some states 
grant legal parenthood to a second parent based on a single 
parent’s passive acquiescence.146 
D. The Problems
Should federal constitutional childcare rightsholders, now
guided by widely varying state law norms on parentage 
establishment and disestablishment, continue to be so different? 
Not if one believes equality principles demand that federal 
constitutional childcare rightsholders should be comparably 
defined regardless of where they live.147  Beyond equality, current 
144 In re F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 92, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 129, 833 N.W.2d 634, 656 
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 4, at 
157–203, 203–11 (reviewing surrogacy laws in the United States as well as 
international surrogacy laws); Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the 
Law, and the Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 486–503 (2015) (reviewing 
American state surrogacy laws); Leora I. Gabry, Note, Procreating Without 
Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need for a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, 45 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 415, 421–31 (2012) (reviewing American state surrogacy 
laws). 
145 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws 
2016, ch. 430) (establishing de facto parent where there is the “support and consent” 
of the child’s single parent); Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2010) (stating that statute is unconstitutional if read to allow a de facto parent 
where there already exist two fit parents). But cf. Barone v. Chapman-Cleland, 10 
N.Y.S.3d 380, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that same-sex partner of a birth 
mother having no childcare interest as “equitable estoppel” did not bar mother’s 
superior childcare rights when partnership dissolved, though the partner had co-
parented for some time with the birth mother’s consent), rev’d, Brooke S.B. v. 
Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016). 
146 See, e.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3, 11 (Ct. App. 2011) (employing 
§ 7611(d) of the California Family Code, and presuming second parent need not be
intended by existing parent to “obtain any legal rights,” but any second parent must
have received child into the home and openly held out the child as one’s own).
147 The interstate variations on who are parents in childcare settings seemingly 
are subject to a Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis, where the focus would 
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American state law differences have prompted other significant 
problems.  One problem is that many Americans do not 
understand the import of the broad state parentage lawmaking 
discretion and the resulting interstate variations in parental 
childcare opportunities and responsibilities.  Like Maury Povich, 
some believe that legal parentage depends only upon biology or 
formal adoption.148  While over time a better understanding 
might develop, there are further problems. 
Many Americans do not understand that differing terms can 
have comparable meanings and similar terms can have differing 
meanings from state to state.  For example, de facto parenthood 
in one state can be comparable to presumed parenthood in a 
second state, while presumed parenthood can have a number of 
meanings across states.149  New United States Supreme Court 
precedents on federal constitutional childcare parents likely will 
unify American state parental childcare nomenclature. 
Another problem involves the uncertainties about legal 
parentage when people move across state borders where very 
different parentage norms apply.  For example, a person can 
meet the de facto parent norm in State A, followed by the child’s 
move to State B where there is no such norm.  Typically, in a 
later childcare dispute in State B, a court in State B will apply 
the parentage laws of State B, though most, if not all, of the 
childcare relevant to any de facto parentage in the person left 
behind in State A occurred in State A.150  As legal parentage 
norms untied to biology and formal adoption become more 
likely be on congressional failures regarding comparably situated child caretakers, 
rather than Supreme Court failures. 
148 See generally Janis Prince Inniss, What Makes a Real Parent?, EVERYDAY 
SOCIOLOGY BLOG (Dec. 30, 2007), http://nortonbooks.typepad.com/everydaysociology/ 
2007/12/what-makes-a-re.html. 
149 See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66; see also 
Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345–47, 346 n.1 (Iowa 2013) 
(demonstrating three separate categories of American state statutes on the 
parentage presumption). 
150 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Choosing Among Imprecise American State 
Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. REV. 481, 485–86 (2015) [hereinafter Parness, Imprecise 
American State Parentage Laws] (criticizing this approach and suggesting ways 
state courts should employ their choice-of-law principles when parentage norms 
differ between interested states). 
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widespread and better-known, savvy lawyers will likely prompt 
their clients to make forum-shopping moves for such purposes as 
avoiding shared childcare or child support.151 
Other problems spring from state law variations on those 
possessing federal parental childcare rights.  If family members 
generally understand their own state parentage laws, and even 
where there are no cross-border moves, many remain uncertain 
as to who is a parent.152  Unlike parentage arising from marriage, 
a birth certificate, a voluntary parentage acknowledgment, or a 
formal adoption, de facto legal parentage and the like are 
imprecise in that they arise from such occurrences as “parent-
like” acts or “bonded and dependent relationship[s],” which must 
be judicially assessed after the fact.153  There will often be great 
uncertainty about how judges will rule in particular cases, even if 
the fuzzy legal norms on parentage are known.  Subjectivity 
reigns, with few objective standards like those in formal adoption 
settings.154  Uncertainty as to parentage often will make more 
difficult the very personal decisions on matters like estate 
planning, gifts, religious upbringing, schooling, and marriage. 
New federal norms can mitigate, if not eliminate, this 
uncertainty.155 
Legal parentage uncertainties can arise even when parties 
have earlier agreed on parentage.  Such uncertainty, for example, 
pervades assisted reproduction settings, as well as settings 
involving childcare agreements for children born of sex.  In the 
151 See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 122, at 1238–39 (“[W]e had to look outside of the 
state in search of a jurisdiction with a more favorable legal atmosphere for 
surrogacy.”). 
152 Parness, Imprecise American State Parentage Laws, supra note 150, at 484. 
153 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws 
2016, ch. 430) (de facto parent status); see also ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) 
(Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.) 
(presumed parent provides “emotional and financial support”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.) 
(presumed parent holds out child “as his or her own”). 
154 For example, certain criminal convictions are absolute barriers in all 
adoption settings. For an argument on the need for more objective standards in 
imprecise parentage settings, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Formalities for Informal 
Adoptions, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 405 (2015) [hereinafter Parness, Informal 
Adoptions]. 
155 For a discussion on how lawyers and judges can better handle claims 
implicating imprecise parentage laws, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Challenges in 
Handling Imprecise Parentage Matters, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 139, 148, 
155, 160–61 (2015). 
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absence of unifying federal norms, states vary in their 
approaches to agreements involving future parentage.156  Not all 
state courts in all settings enforce childcare pacts even where the 
best interests of children will be promoted.157  Some state courts 
deny enforcement simply because the legislatures have not 
affirmatively acted to recognize such agreements, though such 
pacts have not been deemed invalid by statute.158  Significant 
uncertainties on possible enforcement will continue until General 
Assemblies act.  Major nationwide variations will likely remain 
until supreme federal laws operate.  Clearly, the parentage 
standardization initiatives of the Uniform Law Commission,159 
the American Bar Association,160 and the American Law 
Institute161 have not prompted significant interstate agreements. 
156 Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)–(c) (LEXIS through 2016 2d 
Extra. Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.) 
(allowing use of surrogate mothers), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, 
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of the 98th Leg.) (“A surrogate parentage contract 
is void and unenforceable . . . .”). 
157 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. 
of the 98th Leg.). 
158 Consider, for example, the differing judicial approaches to recognizing de 
facto parent status in the absence of legislation. See Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, 
¶¶ 18–19, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176–77 (plurality opinion) (“Parenthood is meant to be 
defined by the Legislature . . . . Although we have been discussing de facto 
parenthood for almost thirteen years, there is currently no Maine statutory 
reference . . . . In the absence of Legislative action . . . we must provide some 
guidance . . . .”). Cf. Moreau v. Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ¶¶ 25–26, 196 Vt. 183, 195–97, 
95 A.3d 416, 424–26 (quoting Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997)) 
(declining the opportunity to formulate a non-statutory de facto parent doctrine as 
“the Legislature is better equipped” to do so); see also LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, ¶ 55, 
338 P.3d 908, 921 (Wyo. 2014) (declining to adopt common law de facto parentage or 
parentage by estoppel). 
159 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
160 See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008). 
For a review of the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, see 
generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
601 (2009). 
161 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002); see also Michael R. Clisham & Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 
42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 611, 613 (2008) (assessing the impact of Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution and finding no significant effect to date). 
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IV. POSSIBLE NEW CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS ON STATE
LAWMAKING 
Greater certainty about legal parentage may not be wholly 
dependent upon a unified federal constitutional approach to 
federal childcare rightsholders.  Congress could redo the 
voluntary paternity-acknowledgment process so as to more 
clearly include only men who actually have, or reasonably believe 
they have, biological ties to the acknowledged children.162  
Congress could also make acknowledgments more easily 
rescindable where there are no biological ties, as by eliminating 
or extending the current sixty-day period for rescissions in the 
absence of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.163 
Congress could, in the alternative, expand the voluntary 
acknowledgment process to include certain men and women with 
no biological ties, establishing a new form of informal adoption, 
especially for children born of sex to unwed mothers or born of 
AHR to a woman in a same-sex relationship.164 
The congressional acknowledgment process was largely 
developed to secure greater reimbursements of governmental 
welfare aid expended to birth mothers on behalf of their 
children.165  This goal could be extended to reimbursements from 
the children’s nonbiological parent-like figures who are not full 
legal parents, at least while they continue to act in parental-like 
ways.  As suggested by one voice in Troxel, there could be 
gradations of nonparents as well as carefully crafted parentage 
definitions.166 
Such congressional revamps, however, are ill-advised.  New 
constraints on acknowledgments and easier rescission standards 
would often harm children and upset settled familial 
expectations.167  New expansions of acknowledgment 
162 Currently, state laws and their acknowledgment forms vary on whether 
signers must affirmatively express beliefs as to likely biological ties. Parness & 
Townsend, supra note 87, at 72–73. 
163 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I)–(II) (West 2014). 
164 See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for 
Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 470 (2012); Jayna 
Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology 
Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 489–
91 (2005). 
165 Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 56–59. 
166 530 U.S. 57, 92–93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
167 Baker, Marriage and Parenthood, supra note 107, at 167–69. 
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opportunities may not prompt greater welfare payment 
reimbursements, but rather prompt the circumvention of child 
protection safeguards attending formal adoptions.168 
Beyond welfare reimbursements, states have wisely chosen 
to employ the congressional voluntary-acknowledgment processes 
for children whose birth mothers have not sought, and will not 
likely seek, welfare assistance.169  To date, there have emerged no 
proposed model codes or uniform laws in these settings that 
could prompt greater national uniformity. 
Some posit that greater certainty on legal parentage may be 
attained by explicit congressional expansions of its voluntary-
acknowledgment process to children with no ties to governmental 
welfare, as well as to parent-like figures with no biological or 
formal adoptive ties.170  Yet, nationalization of such parentage 
norms outside of federal constitutional judicial precedents 
seemingly is foreclosed by the Article I and other constitutional 
limits on congressional authority, as well as by the related Tenth 
Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states.171  
Parents of, and parent-like figures for, children who were born of 
sex, who have not benefitted personally from public assistance 
programs, and who have always lived in a single state where 
conception and birth occurred, are not so tied to interstate 
commerce that congressional power is constitutionally 
authorized.172  Congressional enforcement of federal 
constitutional rights,173 with the rights defined by United States 
Supreme Court precedents, typically cannot encompass statutory 
expansions of the rights or the rightsholders.174 
168 See, e.g., Parness, Informal Adoptions, supra note 154, at 403–04. 
169 Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 63–87 (comparing state voluntary-
acknowledgment laws). 
170 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1683–90, 1695 (2015); Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity
Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 103 (2006); Julia Saladino, Is a Second Mommy a Good Enough
Second Parent?: Why Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity Should Be Available
to Lesbian Co-Parents, MOD. AM., Spring 2011, at 2, 5–6.
171 See supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text. 
172 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 566–67 (1995) (holding that a 
congressional regulation prohibiting the possession of a gun in a gun-free school 
zone as applied to a local student attending a local school was not within 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause). 
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
174 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
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Comparably, congressional action nationalizing the norms on 
parentage presumptions arising from marriage is inadvisable for 
now, even if constitutionally authorized.  Fourteenth Amendment 
congressional enforcement authority may be available to limit 
the otherwise applicable state parentage presumption laws.  For 
example, this authority may be used, via procedural law reforms, 
to better secure the federal constitutional paternity opportunity 
interests of unwed biological fathers in children born of 
adulterous sex.  But, the exercise of such authority now would 
disrupt current state judicial child custody and support powers. 
Moreover, such authority involving the interests of unwed 
biological fathers in children born of sex to unwed mothers is ill-
advised.  Congressional enforcement action will be more 
appropriate when the Supreme Court further clarifies the 
substantive interests of biological fathers that it first recognized 
in Lehr. 
By contrast, Congress can and should act now to establish 
norms guiding medical professionals and others providing AHR 
services.  While the federal constitutional limits on parentage 
contracts in AHR settings remain unclear,175 including on 
matters like waivers of abortion rights, federal statutory 
standards on AHR medical providers, counselors, and other 
service providers, and on information gathering attending AHR 
services, are now both needed and authorized under the 
Commerce Clause.176 
V. POSSIBLE NEW UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LIMITS ON
STATE LAWMAKING 
A. New Parentage Norms
If congressional action addressing the current uncertain and
differing state parentage establishment and disestablishment 
norms is constitutionally foreclosed, unwise, or otherwise 
175 The state laws on surrogacy pacts, both traditional and gestational, vary 
widely and continue to evolve as these agreements increase in number. See, e.g., 
Mark Strasser, Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the 
Challenge for Family Law, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 85, 85–86 (2015); see also 
sources cited supra note 144. 
176 See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520–21 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that reproductive services are commercial activities subject to congressional 
regulation). 
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unavailable, the United States Supreme Court can act to further 
unify federal childcare norms across the country by limiting the 
current broad state lawmaking on federal constitutional 
childcare rightsholders.177  Some problems arising from the 
interstate variations on legal parentage would dissipate if the 
Court resolved a few major issues. 
One major issue is whether a male sperm donor in an AHR 
setting has the same paternity opportunity interest for 
parenthood as does a male whose consensual sex prompts the 
birth of his biological offspring.178  If there are similar interests, 
related questions involve how and when these interests may be 
asserted,179 how and when these interests might be waived—
including whether valid preconception, or postconception but 
prebirth, waivers may be undertaken180—and, given the Michael 
H. precedent, whether any paternity opportunity interest in the
male sperm donor can always be foreclosed if there is a resulting
birth into an intact family, be it same- or opposite-sex.181  Sperm
177 See, e.g., Mutcherson, supra note 78, at 42, 54–55 (discussing possible bases 
for Supreme Court action in AHR, and suggesting “justice framework” rather than 
liberty/autonomy or equality framework, with federal constitutional protections 
different for those in non-coital reproduction who do or do not procreate for profit). 
178 The nature of such a paternity opportunity interest, that is, a fundamental 
right or a right subject to state override as long as laws are rational and not 
arbitrary, is subject to some debate. See, e.g., In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 
(Colo. 1989) (en banc) (declining to decide if statute on lack of paternity in a sperm 
donor in an AHR setting infringed upon a federal constitutional childcare interest 
where the donor had both a pre-conception intent to parent and post-birth contact 
with the child); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (affording 
“due process safeguards” where AHR sperm donor and birth mother agreed before 
implantation “that there would be a relationship between the donor and child”). But 
see In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Mass. 2015) (holding that notice of 
and consent to adoption by same-sex partner of the birth mother in AHR setting is 
not required for known sperm donor “who may [only] have a theoretical basis to 
attempt to establish parentage in the future”); see also Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption 
of J.S.), 2014 UT 51, ¶¶ 58–59, 358 P.3d 1009, 1025 (holding that statutes which set 
forth a “statutory gateway” for unwed biological fathers to assert their parental 
rights are not subject to strict scrutiny under substantive due process). 
179 See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040–41 (Kan. 2007) (finding no 
infringement of substantive due process if sperm donor’s paternity opportunity 
interest in a child born to an unwed birth mother is made dependent upon a writing 
signed by donor and mother). 
180 See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶ 139, 34 
N.E.3d 1132, 1164 (upholding oral contract between ex-girlfriend and ex-boyfriend 
regarding cryopreserved pre-embryos; awarding ex-girlfriend “sole custody and 
control”). 
181 See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d at 836 (recognizing that such a 
donor may sue in paternity, not commenting upon the likely result of such a suit, but 
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contribution via sex might be differentiated as there, unlike AHR 
settings, future pregnancy, birth, and childcare motivate the 
contribution less often. 
Comparably, in AHR settings, might ovum donation prompt 
parentage opportunity interests for the donor, especially where, 
but perhaps not just,182 the donor was in a marital or 
substantially similar relationship with the birth mother and 
where there was a pre-implantation agreement on dual 
parentage? 
Another major issue is whether a birth mother has federal 
constitutional parental childcare interests if she delivers a child 
born of assisted reproduction.  If an assisted reproduction birth 
mother always has such interests, related questions involve how 
and when such interests might be waived, including whether 
preconception,183 or postconception but prebirth, waivers may be 
undertaken.  Of course, there is the potential for federal 
constitutional differences between varying assisted reproduction 
birth mothers, as between mothers who utilized or did not utilize 
their own eggs184 and between mothers who are or are not 
formally contracted gestational carriers.185 
finding that such a donor—even if an uncle, cousin, or other family member whose 
sperm was utilized by a married lesbian couple—was not automatically entitled to 
notice of a proposed adoption by the birth mother’s spouse). 
182 See, e.g., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 346 (Fla. 2013) (citing T.M.H. v. 
D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)) (distinguishing AHR cases
involving lesbian couples where the nonbirth mother was or was not an ovum donor,
that is, was or was not a “biological” or “natural” parent).
183 See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 555–56 (Kan. 2013) 
(concluding that a written co-parenting pact between two female partners, where 
one later delivers an AHR child to be raised by both, is enforceable if the child’s best 
interests are promoted). 
184 See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2002) (holding 
that while a woman giving birth may be presumed the legal mother at birth, 
“evidence of genetic consanguinity” must dissolve that presumption in favor of legal 
parentage for ova and sperm donors, a married couple, so as not to unduly burden 
and frustrate the married donors’ “exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental rights to . . . raise their own children,” with these rights originating in 
both the United States Constitution and Utah’s Constitution). 
185 Of course, regardless of what the Federal Constitution permits, state laws 
often can further control outcomes. See, e.g., In re F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 65, 349 Wis. 
2d 84, 118, 833 N.W.2d 634, 651 (noting that surrogacy contract’s provisions on 
voluntary termination of surrogate’s parental rights cannot be enforced as contrary 
to statutory processes for parental rights terminations). 
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Yet, another major issue is whether a current single legal 
parent may have his or her federal constitutional childcare 
interests diminished, though not terminated, through the 
recognition of a new legal parent with comparable federal 
childcare rights arising from his or her postbirth parental-like 
acts, even though there are no biological or formal adoptive ties. 
If such new “de facto” parenthood is possible over a single 
parent’s current objection, as now exists in some states,186 related 
questions involve what minimal federal constitutional standards 
must operate, including what should be the standards on written 
waivers and on other single parent and de facto parent 
consensual conduct, as with affirmative agreement or passive 
acquiescence.  Some current state de facto parent standards 
seemingly are vulnerable to federal constitutional attack187 as 
they are quite indefinite and lack explicit requirements on 
express single parent consent to, or even passive acquiescence in, 
new “de facto” parenthood in another.188 
186 See, e.g., R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 850 (Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting 
birth mother’s federal constitutional challenge to non-sperm donor’s statutory 
presumed parentage in AHR setting since the court must be “satisfied the parent 
permitted the person to engage with the child at a level that transforms the 
interaction into a full, openly acknowledged two parent relationship”). 
187 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent 
Laws, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 811, 837–42 (2014) [hereinafter Parness, Second Parent 
Laws]. 
188 Passive acquiescence of a single parent to de facto parentage in another often 
arises from a romantic partner’s residence with that parent and the child, combined 
with the partner providing financial resources benefitting the child, who is held out 
by the partner as the partner’s child. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (Westlaw 
through 2016 Reg. Sess. and Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.) (“presumed” 
parent); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. 
Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (“presumed” parent); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 257.55(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 2 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“presumed” 
parent). The superior parental rights of the single parent are less likely to be an 
obstacle if acquiescence to the establishment of the requirements were expressly 
stated to constitute implied consent to possible later second parentage per the de 
facto parent doctrine. See, e.g., Parness, Second Parent Laws, supra note 187, at 
840–41. Cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (plurality opinion) 
(recognizing “all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, 
as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC 
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving 
offense,” with “significant consequences” when consent is withdrawn, though 
withdrawal of consent to possible de facto parentage should be free of adverse 
consequences). 
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A related issue is whether two current parents may have 
their federal constitutional childcare interests diminished, 
though not terminated, through the recognition of a third legal 
parent arising from his or her postbirth parental-like acts, even 
though there are no biological or formal adoptive ties for the 
third parent.189  If a third legal parent is possible over current 
dual or single parent objections—due to earlier consent or 
acquiescence—related questions involve what, if any, minimal 
federal constitutional standards must operate.  For example, if 
one of two current parents with interests cannot veto any 
proposed third parent who has the support of the other current 
federal constitutional childcare parent, are the third parent’s 
childcare interests tethered to and derived from the supporting 
parent’s childcare interests?  Does the third parent lose childcare 
interests when the supporting parent withdraws support, loses 
childcare interests himself, or dies?  And must any possible third 
parent be a family member, like a grandparent or stepparent? 
Another federal constitutional issue is whether there may be, 
automatically or otherwise, a third parent with federal 
constitutional childcare interests because of his or her prebirth 
rather than postbirth acts.  Prebirth acts might include 
preconception donations of genetic material in assisted 
reproduction settings.  Prebirth acts might also include three-
way voluntary acknowledgments, pledges or provisions of 
financial support for the pregnancy or for the future child, and/or 
pledges of future childcare, arising from premarital or 
midmarriage agreements.190 
Yet, another issue is whether a prospective birth mother, 
who will be deemed a mother under law when she gives birth, 
can waive her right to abort.191  If so, further issues involve 
189 See, e.g., Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding 
that both federal and state constitutions bar legal recognition of a third childcare 
parent with no biological or adoptive ties, as it would infringe on the childcare 
interests of the two existing parents). 
190 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 343, 369 (2015).
191 It was reported that Tagg Romney, son of Mitt, and his wife Jen engaged a
surrogate who delivered for them twin sons pursuant to an agreement that if the 
fetus—the contract referenced a “child”—was determined “to be physiologically, 
genetically or chromosomally abnormal,” the abortion decision was “to be made by 
the intended parents.” Id. at 346 n.15 (quoting Dave Hoffman, The Unenforceability 
of Contracts To Abort, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 21, 2012), https://concurring 
opinions.com/archives/2012/09/the-unenforceability-of-contracts-to-abort.html); see 
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whether there can be effective waivers before as well as after 
conception; whether any waivers operate comparably when 
conception resulted from sex or assisted reproduction; whether 
effective waivers can operate in assisted reproduction settings 
both when her own or another’s eggs were used; and, whether 
effective waivers depend on the prospective mother’s marital 
status, and, if so, whether marital status is relevant at the time 
of the waiver, conception, or pregnancy.  If some waivers of the 
right to abort are effective, there would be enforcement issues. 
Can judicial orders forbid abortions due to earlier waivers?  Who 
may seek such waivers?  And who has standing to enforce, given 
that husbands and intended parents in surrogacy settings may 
not be similarly treated? 
When litigants seek guidance on these issues, the U.S. 
Supreme Court should hear their cases. 
B. Other New United States Supreme Court Limits on State
Lawmaking Discretion
In addition to further unifying federal constitutional
parental childcare in the United States via new parental 
childcare precedents, the Supreme Court also could further unify 
childcare interests via new federal constitutional precedents 
operating outside of parentage.  For example, varying types of 
nonparents, often called third parties, are now childcare 
rightsholders under state law.  Nonparents are afforded childcare 
interests under state laws that differ from parental childcare 
interests.  Might there be federal constitutional nonparental 
childcare interests for grandparents, stepparents, or others?192  
Federal constitutional issues on such nonparental childcare 
include whether blood ties are needed, or are especially 
important so that, for example, grandparents must be 
distinguished from stepparents; whether parental consent is 
necessary, and, if so, whether passive acquiescence suffices; and, 
what the nature of nonparental conduct required to prompt such 
also I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not To Procreate, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1135, 1191–95 (2008) (laying out a number of reasons why states may be wary 
about enforcing abortion contracts). 
192 M.C. v. Adoption Choices of Colo., Inc., 2014 COA 161, ¶¶ 33, 42, 369 P.3d 
659, 668, 670 (finding that a prospective adoptive couple had no “protected liberty 
interest in their relationship with the child they hope[d] to adopt,” where an earlier 
adoption decree was voided), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In Interest of Baby A., 
2015 CO 72, ¶ 59, 363 P.3d 193, 209. 
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interests is.  As with parental childcare, nonparental childcare 
laws benefiting grandparents, stepparents, and others193 now 
vary significantly interstate.194 
The Supreme Court might also consider the federal 
constitutional interests of children in certain adult childcare195 or 
in maintaining certain sibling relationships.196  Here, the 
rightsholders would be children who have interests in receiving 
love, affection, and childcare. 
Further, per new case law, children may be deemed federal 
constitutional rightsholders as to information regarding their 
biological roots, thereby allowing for more intelligent decisions 
193 Some nonparental childcare laws now expressly include siblings and great-
grandparents. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(a-3) (West, Westlaw 
through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (repealed 2016). Nonparental child 
caretakers can also include adult siblings; to date, the courts have not discussed 
their federal constitutional childcare interests. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings 
in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 930 (2012) (“Lastly, states should consider whether 
full or half-siblings separated by divorce, the end of a nonmarital relationship, or a 
parent’s death will have an enforceable right to contact, communication, and 
visitation, unless a court determines that such connection would be contrary to the 
best interests of one or more siblings.”). 
194 See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third 
Parties To Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2–5 (2013). 
195 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (expressing that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not “had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty 
interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial 
relationship”); M.C., 2014 COA at ¶ 53, 369 P.3d at 671 (holding child has no liberty 
interest in continuing relationship with prospective adoptive couple); B.B. v. B.C. (In 
re Adoption of I.B.), 19 N.E.3d 784, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that 
children have a “liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their 
existing familial relationship” with maternal grandmother who was statutorily 
ineligible to adopt, but where statute was unconstitutional as applied), vacated, 32 
N.E.3d 1164 (Ind. 2015); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 557 (Kan. 2013) 
(deeming that denial to children with two parents the opportunities to continue their 
childcare by a nonparent under law “impinges upon the children’s constitutional 
rights”). 
196 See, e.g., In re Adoption of I.B., 19 N.E.3d at 791 (concluding that siblings 
have “a liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their existing 
familial relationship and are entitled to be free from arbitrary state action affecting 
that relationship”). But see Sacramento Cty. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. 
Luke H. (In re Luke H.), 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, 64–65 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding no 
constitutional protection of sibling relationships over custodial parent’s objection); 
Nebraska v. Jeffrey H. (In re Meridian H.), 798 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Neb. 2011) (finding 
no federal or state constitutional right, to date, involving continuing sibling 
relationships, as where one sibling is placed in foster care and two siblings are 
adopted). Often constitutional interests are not even raised. See, e.g., B.L.M. v. A.M., 
381 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); see also JAMES G. DWYER, THE 
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006); Hasday, supra note 193 (generally 
supporting a child’s interest in a continuing sibling or sibling-like relationship). 
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about health care, procreation, and the like.  Thus, for example, 
when children born of sex are formally adopted, or about to be 
adopted, by foster parents or others where the biological fathers 
are unknown, state officers could be obligated to secure and 
maintain information on those with biological ties for later use by 
the children, at least for certain purposes like medical decision 
making.197  For now, generally there are no such state laws. 
There are few duties on governmental officials to identify 
unknown, usually male, biological parents whose children are 
placed for formal adoption.198 
CONCLUSION 
United States Supreme Court precedents recognize federal 
constitutional childcare rights in parents that may not be easily 
diminished or eliminated under law.  Yet, these childcare 
rightsholders are mainly defined by state laws, which vary 
widely on parentage and can be dependent upon biological ties, 
functional parenthood, or contracts.  Deference to state 
lawmaking here is unique as no other federal constitutional 
rights depend on state law definitions of rightsholders.  This 
deference has led to many problems that cannot be, or should not 
be, addressed by Congress.  The Supreme Court should soon 
answer several important questions about federal childcare 
parents.  This would reduce current problems and recognize 
federal constitutional childcare rightsholders under national 
norms as exist for all other federal constitutional rightsholders. 
197 See, e.g., Ronald K. Henry, The Innocent Third Party: Victims of Paternity 
Fraud, 40 FAM. L.Q. 51, 68 (2006) (“The child’s best and only interest in paternity 
establishment lies in finding that child’s biological father. That child needs to know 
his or her genetic heritage for medical purposes.”). 
198 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the Parental Prerogatives of Unwed 
Natural Fathers: Deterring Lost Paternity, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 345, 348–49 (2000) 
(reviewing federal substantive and procedural due process protections of unwed 
biological fathers in their children and suggesting how expanded procedural 
protections can deter the unwarranted abortions of male parental rights in adoption 
proceedings). 
